celebrated its twentieth a nniversary, something without precedent in the entire history of Spain.
T hese are not the only historical da tes lo have been specially commemorated in Spain duri ng the past d ecade. Go ing back to the Socialist period, in 1988 there was the celebration of the bicente nary of the d eath of C harles m, a moment used for officia l exalta ti on o f the reformi st work o f the very moderate enlightened Spaniards, contrasting with the sli ght interest aroused a year la ter by the bicente nary of the Fre nc h Re vo lution. In the same year, 1988, the na ti o nalist autono mous government of Catal onia rromoted the celebration of the 'millennium of the Catalan nation ' , and in 1992 it placed special e mphasis on the centenary o f the Bases de Manresa , representec.1 as the o ri gin o f modern r o litical Catalanism. None of those eve nts came anywhere near ac hieving the impact of the great commemoration par excelle11ce, the quincentenary of the 'di scovery' o f America, promoted in th is case by the national government at the height of the Socialist e ra. Jn the 1990s there were also commemorations of less substance anc. 1 witho ut muc h official support which did not penetrate deepl y into publi c opinion bu t served to recall, for example, the fig ure of the dictator Franco I 00 years after h is bi rth ( 1992), a nc.1 the comple tion of 20 years since the beginning of the transition to democracy ( 1995) a nd 60 yea rs since the sta rt of the C ivil War (I 996). In 1997, wi th the right-wing go vernment of the Pop ula r Pa rty having recently assumed power, o fficial interest in hi stori cal comme morati ons became · appa rent once again. The reason that yea r was the cente nary of the assassinatio n of th e Conservative leade r Antonio Canovas dcl Castillo, the architect in 1874 of th e restoration of the monarchy and the consolidation in Spain o f a moderately liberal parliamentary regime t hat, ne vertheless, subseque ntl y r rovec.1 incapable of e vol ving towarc.ls tru e de mocracy. Immed iately afte rwards came I 998, as no ted , and the commemoration of the 100 yea rs since the colonial 'disaster' and 400 years s ince Philip II 's death.
The commemorations just me ntioned are examples of a new ki nd of political use of history. Today the myths culti vated by national/Catholic fu ndamentalism have become things of the past, as has the ideological combat that conditioned the development of Spa nish histo riography for most of the twentieth century. T be new political uses of history a re of a different kind. Most often they have the support of hi storia ns and an academic backing tbat ma kes the m professionally ' respectable' . C riticis ms of the motivation fo r these institutional initiatives ra rely achieve public noti ce. The installation of democracy led to a weake ning of the old my ths and great ideologies against the background o f whi ch a tradition of 'scientific histo ry ' had laboriously been created. Politically committed academic activity began to be abandoned, and mosl professional historians attached a high value to the culti vation of aseptic monographs and professional debate among specialists as natural elements of their work. In many cases this attitude then became compatible with an evident sense of pleasure in initiatives of an institutional nature that presented the appearance of 'scientific professionalism'. The social impac t of these initiatives conferred on history a usefulness all the more appreciable as the weight of the old discipline in our current educational system diminished. At the same time, history increasingly became a target of political exploitation, although in a new way.
The politics of history in Spain at present cannot simply be reduced to the conntry's intense involvement in official commemorations during the past decade. In a quite different context we must also refer to the role played by legal proceedings of international scope such as those that elucidated the participation of Franco's government and ceriain Spaniards close to it in the plundering of Jews during World War II, or magistrate Baltasar Garzon's action against Pinochel fo r his responsibility in connection with the lorture and murder of Spa nish citizens, among others, in Chile afte r the military coup against Salvador Allende's democratic government. There has also been a very significant response in the media to certain polemics, such as those focusing on the nature of the Franco regime and its similarities and differences with respect to fascism, 1 the pros and cons of a transition not as exemplary as we had been led to believe, ' and. recently, the controversy over the role of certain o utstanding intellectuals in the 1940s. supporters of the dictatorship at the time and later outstanding points of reference in the opposition to it.' The educational function of history has become the subject of intense political debate.~ and two university events have evoked politically uncomfortable memories: the reception and tribute given to survivors of the International Brigades in the auditorium of the Unive rsity of Valencia and the conference on the Maquis (the Republican guerrilla forces that continued armed resistance agai nst Franco 's dictatorship after the e nd of the Civil War) also organized within that university.
The political role currently played by history in Spain is not comparable to the part it played in the time of Franco's dictatorship, but equally it contrasts with the silence and forgetfulness promoted during the transition to democracy by political 111ea11s (parties, government) and for political purposes (to help to bring about a peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy after Franco's death in 1975). The desire to achieve a peaceful solution supported by a broad consensus made certain questions about the past awkward. The political climate of the late 1970s and early 1980s tended to favour forgetfulness with the aim of encouraging concord and reconciliation among Spaniards. The transition to democracy was accompanied by fea r of remembering the immediate past; the future counted more than a history full of failures which some might use as weapons against others. Directly or indirectly, the great catastrophe of the Civil War continued to weigh upon the conscience of most Spaniards. However, as democracy became established and the intensity of the changes turned Spaniards away from fratricidal conflict and as those who had lived through the Civil War moved out of the public eye or disappeared, the amnesia ceased to have the political meaning conferred upon it by the 'agreed-upon' transition to democracy. In the new atmosphere of the late 1990s we begin to see signs of a personal and collective need to recover the past in a different way, far removed from the commonplaces promoted by the old ideologies and from the oblivion that falsely closed the wounds of the past during the transition.
THE POLITICS OF HISTORY AND NAT ION AL IDENTITY
Of all collective identities, national identity is by far the one that has predominated in the past two centuries. A certain tradition of memory and history crystallized around the nation as a new hegemonic collective identity. The France of the Third Republic is the supreme example of the process of constructing a tradition of memory (Jes lieux de memoire) and a science of history that remained in the hands of professionals specialized in its study and convinced that they were employing the 'scientific method' and had the abili ty to convert documents into 'objective evidence' derived from the past. The use of that tradition of memory and science of history for political ends (to legitimize, unite, and perpetuate the nation-state) and the close link between it and nationalist ideology have been pointed out on numerous occasions. However, there are other aspecl<; of the relationship between politics, memory, and history that deserve to be taken into consideration and that arise only when the frame of reference is not the process of bnilding a strong hegemonic national identity at the prompting of the state, in the style of France, but the manifest weakness of the state when that objective has been achieved.
Spain is different from other Mediterranean countries in a number of ways. The use of history has also played a fundamental political role here in ideological conflicts, especially in the conflict that arises from the construction of a 'state-centred' national identity. At the heart of that process and with that conflict as a setling, memory and history have been used in an uncritical, simplistic way for purposes of ideological propaganda. In Spain as in France and Portugal, the modem stale goes back to a very early date, and therefore in the origins of this state both history and politics were subordinated to the interests of certain social sectors and corporations with their particular privileges. The modern state arose in Spain, as in France and Portugal, long before the existence of a public sphere favourable for the exercise o f politics as we understand it now o r o f a specific professional environ ment for the cultivation of history. It was, therefore, a state that preceded nationalist ideology, a state that over several centuries acquired modern features which did not, however, include considering the imposition of a national identity. What is characteristic of Spain, however, is that the state sought to legitimize itself through an ideology, that of the Catholic empire, which, while not yet strictly nationalist, was later able to evolve towards a kind of nationalism that has left a Jong, deep mark on our contemporary hi story.
Two further characteristics are provided by the fact that during the period of nationalisms Spain, in contrast to France, lacked a strong, incontrovertible national identity and a history to support it in a professional, 'scientific' way.
• Throughout the twentieth century the weak establishment in Spain of that identity and that type of history was linked with the emergence of two kinds of conflict: conflict between various conceptions of Spanish national identity, which prevented the development of a hegemonic national consciousness, and conflict between those who supported a Spanish identity and those within the state who rejected that identity and defended the constructions of national identities other than the Spanish. T hese conflicting identities created their own images of the past and advocated different kinds of history.
As a result, no strong hegemoni c tradition of a nation-state variety of memory/history emerged in Spain. History that identifies nation with state and provides them with a common nation-state-centred identity recognized as belonging to them by most citizens -the 'classical' or 'traditional' history capable of forming or reinforcing a national consciousness that coincides with the territorial limits of the state -has had little social influence. Still Jess, lherefore, have there been the conditions necessary for using that memory/history to create a national critical history, the kind of history that Pierre Nora has proposed in France, starting from the concept of lieux de 111e111oire 1 and seeking to adapt national history to the new scientific and civic needs of our time. The odd study on ' places of memory' can be found in S pain, 8 but the country lacks a tradition capable of establishing iL'ielf in the academic world and in public opinion in such a way as either to mai ntain interest in a traditional kind of national history or to propose a new national history setting out from the alternative proposal of
That there is no strong hegemonic tradition of a nation-state vari ety of memory/history in S pain at present can be verified in three ways. First, during the past three decades the history of Spain has gradually been displaced by history concerned with subjects other than the nation-state such as stateless nations and regions (the 'autonomous communities' ), small societies of a local nature (rural or urban). or social groups (social classes, professional groups, women). T he recent reaction to this abandonment of the hi story of Spain is eloquent in this connection. Some recently published histories of Spain (those o f Garcia de Cort:izar and Tusell)'' must be placed in this context, but their relati ve success in publishing terms must by no means be understood as a trend. Second, the recent 'debate on the humanities' has highlig hted a profound d ivergence among the various public authorities with responsibilities fo r education (central government and autonomous governmen ts), between public authorities and historians, and even among historians. 10 This conflict, which has attracted public attention, is indicative of the current complete Jack of agreement about the kind of history that should be taught in Spain.
Third, there is the polemic nurtured by the various party leaders and certain groups of intellectuals with a strong influence on public opinionbecause of their frequent appearances in the media -about whether the democratic state is authorized to promote a nationalization of collective memory and o f history. The fact that there is discussion about whether such a nationalization makes sense nowadays and how it should be carried out (whether in favour of a predominantly Spanish national identity or of recognition of the vario us national identities on an equal footing, where the plurali ty of national entities sho uld lead, and so on) shows a total lack of political consensus. On the one hand there are those who support reinforcing Spanish national identity and for that purpose recovering the history of Spain while at the same time promoting the nationalization of memory and history as classically conceived. On the other hand, there are those who reject the idea that the 'state of autonomous regions' should even consider such a possibility, since it would favour the cultural and political standardi zation characteristic of the past in the face of the tendency towards plurality and decentralization of our time. The former complain of the absence of a memory and hi story of the Spanish nation that might provide a solid basis for awareness of a common identity extending to all inhabitants of the state. The latter criticize the attempt to use history to legitimize state-centred nationalism and advocate the creation of new collective identities, both supranational (a united Europe) and subnational (cities, regions, former stateless nations).
To use a musical metaphor borrowed from Jeffrey Olick, 11 it seems as if, after a long period during which the /10111opho11y of the eschatology o f the church persisted, only relatively recently to disappear, motlern Spain has fully enlered the pvlyto11ality of multiculturalism wilhout having known, other than briefly and always imperfectly and controve rsially, the pnlyphn11y of national state ownership.'! TWO POLITICALLY OPPOSED KINDS OF HISTORY The fact that Spain lacks a slrong, deeply rooted tradition of memory/history of the kind that we find in nation-states in the West is clearly due to a variety of factors that could equally account for the much discussed weakness of the nation/state in our country. 1 J As far as the constitution of that tradition is directly concerned. in twentieth century Spain there were two almost opposite ways of representing the past and the process or path traced in it." Those two contlicling global views of our history were uourished by the clash between two ideologies that disputed political hegemouy throughout the nineteenth century and the bette r part of the twentieth. The deep ideological and political fracture of Spain that gave rise to those two traditions of historical memory goes back to the point when the a11cie11 regime went into a crisis and the liberal revolution made its appearance. Since then the conflict, sometimes latent and sometimes manifest in the form of successive civil wars, has been reproduced equally in the view of the past and in the use of history as a basis for national identities in the new state. Two opposed views of the history of Spain -one here called 'orthodox' because of its traditional nature and another in tune with liberal thinking -confronted one another without either managing to achieve clear dominion for most of the twentieth century.
The 'orthodox' view has its roots in the religious and state-centred conception that emerged at the time of the Catholic empire, when the Spanish monarchy expanded in Europe and created a huge colonial empire in America. This conception of history had the implicit consent of the new state, which, despite its formally liberal nature, left primary education in the hands of the Catho lic Church. Later, during the twe ntieth century, 'orthodox' history had the support of two dictatorships (the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, between 1923 and 1930, and the dictatorship of Franco, betweeu 1939 and 1975, the latter with totalitarian pretensions), and it was very muc h present in schools until at least the 1960s.
The 'orthodox' history of Spain is a simple Manichean account of historical events enacted by heroes and martyrs of the national/Catho lic cause. Without a break, the thread of that history links the prehistoric origins of the 'beloved country' (the moment when the Celtiberians, with their 'simple customs' and 'independent nature', brought about the emergence of the 'true Spanish race' ) to the ' miracle' of the introduction of Christianity (thanks to St James the Apostle anJ the intervention of the Virgin of the Pillar), the constitution of the Yisigothic Catholic monarchy (which united the Peninsula for the first time), and the advance of the Reconquest during the Middle Ages (which fi nally succeeded in expelling the invaders who supported the ' false prophet MohammeJ'). Seen in this way, the history of Spain culminates in the glorious reign of the Catholic monarchs with the definitive religions and political unification of the country, the creation of the ' Holy Tribunal of the Inquisition', which succeeJed in preserving national/Catholic unity, anJ the 'discovery' of America, opening up the new continent to Hispanic evangelization. Later there is the pinnacle of the Christian empire during the reigns of Charles V and Philip II anJ the increasing decline as rulers moved away from the Jesigns of Ji vine providence, gave up the traditional spirituality promoted by the Catholic Church, and fell into the hands of 'materialistic and foreign' ideologies alien to the 'true nature' -spiritual and national -of the Spanish people.
This interpretation of history, which set out to explai n the greatness and decline of Spain in accordance with its adherence to church and monarchy, preserved a Jistinctly traditional, antimodern character derived from the old counter-Reformation iJeology from the time of the empire. With a few significant modifications it was able to adapt to the new middle-class society and (especially in the rural Spain that continued to predominate until the mid-nineteenth century) counteract the political advances of liberalism. Thanks to the predominant role of the Catholic Church in primary education, this kind of history was very much a part of the education of Spaniards until the last third of the twentieth century.1. 1
Later, the Franco regime used the national/Catholic view of the history of Spain and the tradition of memory that it provided (St James the Apostle, Covadonga and Pelayo, el Cid, the Catholic Monarchs, Hisp<midad) to legitimize a national/militarist ideology and a theocratic/charismatic conception of the state that was fitting ly personifie<l by the figure of the Caudillo or 'Leader' . The Caudillo, having won the war, thereby became the one chosen by divine providence to rescue Spain from its decline and lead it along the path to the imperial glory of bygone years. In this way, with the sole but important modification that militarist caudillismo introduced in occupying the position of the monarchy, vacant since the victory of the Second Republic, during Franco's era the history of Spain officially continued to correspond to the same divine plan that had long before been 'revealed' by national/Catholic ideology and historiography.
According to this view of the past. the Spanish people, who had been chosen by divine provi<lence, constantly displayed a national character in harmony with the spiritual values of the Catholic Church, values of which the army, triumphant in the Civil War of 1936-39, was now the main guarantor. All this provided a basis for the indissoluble unity of Spain and gave meaning to the struggle against any kind of ' invasion, heresy, separatist tendency and pernicious lay ideology, anti-Spanish by nature', among which freemasonry, liberalism, and communism were prominent. When Spain had good rulers whose desire was not to imitate other nations but 'to maintain the virtues of the race' and 'to follow the designs of God', it attained its 'supreme imperial greatness' .1r.
This religious fundamentalisl conception of the history of Spain obviously had an ideological basis with traditional, antimodem leanings that its promoters at no point sought to hide. With such an ideology there was little need for the research work of professional historians, work that at the beginning of the twentieth century was barely established academically in Spain. in contrast· to France or Germany, and that hardly began to be developed during the first third of that century. For the nutional/Catholic representation of the past to adorn itself with a certain intellectual air it was sufficient to refer to the work of prestigious Catholic philosophers of the nineteenth century such as Donoso Cortes y Balmes or to fall buck on the most reactionary ideas of the early Menendez y Pelayo.
To combat such a view of the past it was not sufficient for a different ki nd of history to emerge in the ucademic world. It was undoubtedly important that in some classes in secondary education institutes and universities at the end of the nineteenth century a history appeared that was conceived as a positive science ready to dismantle reactionary myths and criticize the manipulation of the past. But challenging the trad itional ideology required an alterm1tive global view, and for this purpose, in addition to the scientific conception of history, literature with a historicul content and especially the new literary genre of the historical novel proved enormously useful. 17 The liberal Fiew of the history of Spain was much more in accord with the modern nationalist spirit lhat was developing in the more advanced states in Europe, but it was limited with regard to its development in universities and its diffusion in society. Following the lines of liberal ideology, the course of history now became a permanent setting for 1he struggle of the Spanish people against political or religious tyranny. Without relinquishing the idea of the very ancient origins of the Spanish nation, liberal criticism focused on the end of the Visigothic monarchy (because it was a theocratic one) and the times of religious intolerance, especially during lhe era of Philip II. The Middle Ages were positively evaluatel.I in terms of the limitations on monarchic power imposed by the Spanish parliament and municipalities in the Christian kingdoms and the religious tolerance lhat, despile the war, existed on both sides during the Reconquest. The particular characterisiic of Spain, it was even said, was the coexistence of Christians, Moors, and Jews in the Midtlle Ages, despite the conflicts that it caused. In modern times the re was a special attraction in attempts to set limits to authoritarian power, as happened during the revolts of the Co111111iidades in Castile and the Germanfas in Valencia. The e nlighte ned reformism of Charles HI's reign, in the mitleightee nth century, was presented as the heginning of a truly Spanish revol ntion, subsequently c ut short hy the shameful reign of Charles IV and the Napoleonic invasion.
After a nine teenth century o f constant civil wars and conflicts that prevented the occurrence of the revolution that the country needed. a new stage seemed to commence at the start of the twentieth century with prospects of the 'regeneration' of Spain. T he material and intellectual progress of the Spani sh people depended on the success of that revolution, which quite clearly was to be one promoted from above anti aitletl by the enlightened classes, thus avoiding the violent outbreak of mass tliscontenl that was perceived as an imminent danger. This view of history was bound up with a plan of transformation that set its sight on motlern developed Europe a nd considered the oltl traditional Spain, the Spain that officially professed to he Catholic, an encumbrance from the past. Similarly, in the opinion of the more advanced liberals, political unity could be preservetl only by the concession of a greater tlegree of freedom, so that the differe nt peoples of which Spain consisted could be provided with their own governments (either from a radical perspective, disposed lo refound the state, as defentled by republican federalists with scant success, or else from a tlifferenl pe rspective, much more motlerate in tone anti autonomist and regi onalist in style). It was a further lesson providetl by the liberal, lay, progressive histo ry that in different periotls of o ur development a common popular democratic demantl for decentralization and self-government resisted the repression exercised by authoritarian powers.
This liberal, nationalist conception of the history of Spain, contrasting with the tradition of memory promoted by the national-Catholic view, had its moment of victory, albeit short-lived, tluring the Second Republic (in the historiographic renovation whose most outstantling figure was Rafael Altamira).'" Subsequently, from 1939 onwards, it had to seek refuge in exile or in secrecy as the winners of the war imposetl an almost complete disregard of those ideas until Franco's dictatorship began to tolerate a certain sort of dissitlence in the late 1950s.
In the final stage of the dictatorship the out-and-out supporters of the Franco regime continueu , with more or less scholarly rigour accordi ng lo their level of education and intellectual stature, to defend a trauitional, 'orthodox' history of Spain. repeating the clicht!s of liispanidad and identification with Catholicism, the unity of the nation since remote times. the Christian empire that had been succeeded by a decline due to bad rulers, and criticism of the enlightened reformism, liberalism, anti socialism that had been imported from abroad. In addition to all this there was now a special interest in the figu re of Ferdinand VU, the king who, between 1815 and 1833, sought to preserve the traditional order c haracteristic of the a11cie11 regime and introduce certain economic reforms. After his death, which some saw as a forewarning of what would happen when Franco disappeared. the crisis of the a11ci e11 regime -accordi ng to this reactionary view of our history -gave way to a chaotic nineteenth century of interminable fratricidal fights with no strong power capable of containing them, an image of the imminent di saster foreseen by those who supported the dictatorship at all costs. Those who opposed the regime, in contrast within a very broad ideological spectrum, resisted the image of a Spain historically incapable of freedom and democracy and the idea of a Spanish character inherently opposed to the modern values prevailing in Europe.
It is not a question here of anal ysing in detail how the traditional view of the history of Spain lost credibility and the capacity for political legitimatio n in the final years of Franco's dictatorship. Various factors coutri buted, among the m (a) the social effects of the accelerated industrialization and urbanization of the I 960s; (b) the changes that took place within the Catholic Church as a result of the Second Vatican Council; (c) the opening up to Europe that the dictatorship allowed with a view to its own perpetuation: (d) the work of a generation of new historians in Spain who undertook the task of demolishing the official orthodoxy and provided a totally different interpretation, from a liberal perspective but adopting the new economic and social history that prevailed in Europe at the time; and (e) access to secondary and university ed ucation for an ever greater proportion of the population. All of these things helped to weaken a strongly ideologizetl representation of the past, the simple Manichean view of our history described as 'orthodox' which, during much of the twentieth century, shaped the mentality of a large number of Spaniards. Nowadays this view of the past is so remote and foreign that it is almost a curiosity: hence its a ppeal for readers or audiences when it is shown to us in books, films, or plays abont those times. 1 " However, mentalities and altitudes shape<l by this 'orthodox' view of the history of Spain are still much more prevalent in Spain than is generally believed.
As society became industrialized during the 1960s and an increasi ng number of young people gained access to secondary and higher education in Spain, history began to develop as a discipline in our universities, as had happened in other nearby countries long before. At the time, <luring the 1960s and early 1970s , that is to say, at the height of the struggle against the dictatorship, that development did not exclude political commitment on the part of some historians. A fai r number of them made this quite clear without there being any effect on the quality of the research that they conducted. Thanks to the impressive advance that took place in historical research during those two decades, it was possible to write the history of Spain from a perspective previously unknown and in a totally new way, less national and Spanish-centred, broader and more varied than had been imagined by classical liberal progressivism, and without the old organicist essentialism that had previously permeated the liberal view of the past.:u
The history subsequently produced in Spain took its place full y within the framework of renovation, sharing its multiplication of subjects of investigation, exploration of new sources, and use of new methods which in gene ral terms led to a division of historiography into separate subdisciplines. The absence of great debates was the most striking feature in the case of Spain, accompanied by an accumulation of publications about the most di verse topics but without major works of synthesis such as those that had appeared at the beginning of the process of transformation. The new 'state of autonomies' favonred a separate history for each of the regions or nationalities that constituted Spain. For these and other reasons, the victory of democracy did not resolve the old conflict between the two nationalist ideologies and their respective views of the past in favour of the constitu tion of a single tradition of Spanish national memory/history. On the contrary, democracy made the disagreement even plainer.
Nevertheless, in a political context that changed radically as the transition to democracy took place, general views about the history of Spain underwent very significant modifications. In the early stages of the historiogruphic renovation, during the 1950s and 1960s, the period that aroused the interest of historians was the time of transition from the m1cie11 regime to modern contemporary society. At the same time, those who were fond of the medieval era or felt nostalgia for imperial Spain received the criticism of unofficial historiography, which ultimately transmitted an image of a history of Spain little different from that of Europe. ~1 Comparison with what was considered characteristic of the recent history of the democratic countries of the West did, however, reveal one feature specific to the development of Spain: the lack of dynamism in everything connected with social change. There had been no revolution of an intensity similar lo that of the one that took place in France or other parts of Europe but instead a change of a political nature in a timidly liberal direction. The ultimate reason, it was thought then, was the country's economic backwardness and the absence of a middle class that was a natural consequence of that backwardness. By contrast with the more advanced countries of Europe, which experienced industrialization and the rise of an enterprising middle class, the Spain of the nineteenth centu ry was characterized by the domini on of the oltl no bility and by a society anti a dual economy in which sector and class features of an incomplete transition coexisted. The economic, political, and ideological weakness of the middle classes contrasted with the prestige and social power of blue-blooded aristocrats, large landowners, and leaders in the area of finance. The oligarchical power bloc that was created in the nineteenth century, after a liberal revolution that had left intact the economic foundations of the power of the old aristocracy. had thus proved to be a hindrance to economic development and evolution towards democracy.
Onto this image. which had many points in common with liberal historiography prior to the victory of Franco's dictatorship. two Jci nds o f influences were superimposed in the 1970s during the transition from dictatorship to democracy -influences that in the end modified it without going so far as to question it. The first was explicitly Marxist in orientation, but it would be false to attribute to it the economicism anti dogmatism of the political ideology that inspired it. Allhough there was and still is that kind of Marxism in Spanish historiography. one of the few debates to have attained a certain importance in Spain -whether there had been a 'middleclass revolution' c.luring the nineteenth century -revealed not one but several ways of conceiving Marxism to explain the history of Spain, some of which were so 'heterodox' that they anticipated conclusions about the revolutionary process later judged to be 'revisionist' in the rest of Europe. The second influence, evident since the 1970s, came fro m the 'new economic history' and the 'new political history' that began to develop as an allernative to the influence of Marxism. Both initially put the accent on the obstacles lo modernization in the course of the nineteenth anti twentieth centuries.
PO LITICS AND HISTORY IN T HE 1990s
Gradually, what bad been a view of history dominatec.I by the idea of Spain's economic and political backward ness acquired a completely different significance. During most of the twentieth century the awareness of this backwarc.lness by comparison with the development of the other democratic states of Western Europe had led to an emphasis on two disasters, the loss of the last remains of the American empire in 1898 and the Civil War of 1936-39, which brought out the magnitude of the catastrophe and 'Spain's foilure ·. For a long time these two events created a sense of shock in the historical and political consciousness of Spaniards. If only because of the lack of a democratic regime, the political situation in the final period of the dictatorship and the beginning of the negotiated transition seemed to justify the hypercritical attitude of historians towards our past. Once democracy began to consolidate, however, a different image of the history of Spain began to win supporters. This image increasingly emphasized its similarity to the path followed by the more advanced countries in Europe and played down the importance of the 'failures' mentioned. In the past decade a good many historians have gradually begun to question the classic theses of progressive historiography (liberal-nationalist, either economic and social or Marxist-influenced) and instead to stress the image of a ' normal' historical development that could not be perceived until now, either inside or outside the country, for fundamentally ideological reasons.!! The fact that the commemorations enthusiastically supported by the governments of one political tende ncy or another have openly profited from this new paradigm which insists on the normality of our history should neve rtheless have put the revisionist hi storians -so critical of the ideologies of the past -on their guard. The first of the commemorations that clearly drew political advantage from the results of the current revisionism was tbe one that took place in 1988, on the occasion of the bicentenary of the death of Charles Ill. Both the monarchy and the enlightened ministers who governed in that period with the monarchy's consent were presented as agents of the modernization of the country considerably before the outbreak of the French Revolution. They thus hecame an encouraging antecedent for the current democratic monarchy of King Juan Carlos I and the third course followed by the Socialist government, showing its equidistance from the old revolutionary aspirations of the classical left and the extre me conservatism of the right that has almost always governed Spain. As a timely complement, in 1992 the quincentenary of the 'discovery' of America brought, in the words of the historian Jose Marfa Jover, 'a kind of veneer of universality enhancing the recent glad tidings that henceforth we were to be Europeans and that the years of isolation after the Civil War were gone for good' .!J Very shortly before, the Socialist government -an enthusiastic promoter of both commemorations -had succeeded in making Spain a full member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, going against what had previously been the political posture of the party that sustained it.
In the final yenrs of the Socialist period, bowever, there was a surprising change. Suddenly a mood of crisis and mistrust set in. with a great wave of accusations of corruption involving people close to Felipe Gonz{tlez's government. This mood placed a question mark over the optimistic image of Spain 's historical nom1ality, and there was a revival of the old doomladen view of a corrupt Spain in which, under the cloak of poli tics, caciques and clienteles proliferated. The economic and financial scandals and the discovery of the political conspiracy o f the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberaci6 n) (an antiterrorist group that had exercised violence against the circles of the Basque separatist ETA wi th the complicity even of certain officials of the M inistry of the Interior) indicated the inheritance of a system that had survived from the dictatorship as a result of concessions to the past made during the transition.
Jn this context, in 1994 the best-selling history book Brel'e his1oria de Esp01ia, by Fernando Garcfa de Cortazar and Jose Manuel Gonzalez Vesga, put forward the i<lea of an 'unfinished Spain', constantly passing through areas of light and shade along its path. After experiencing an exemplary transition to de mocracy during the governments of Adolfo Suarez anti the first Socialist era, Spai n was by then in full recession, with a government that was exercising a monopoly of control of public institutions or acting as a ' front for the phenomena of corruption that mark the end of the third Socialist legislature', ·an indus try dismantled by competition from European prod uc ts, a di soriented agric ulture and the unstoppable g rowth of unemployme nt', 'a materialistic society devoid of utopias' and 'the ra<licalizati on of the 11a1io11alis1 movements' . 2 ' This panorama, which suddenl y had become so contrary to the exaggerated optimism of n few years earlier, was described in such apocalyptic tones that it was possible lo see through it to the political purpose of the accusation. In addition to the discrediting of Felipe Gonzalez, who had headed the government for too long and was by the n suspected of seeking to perpetuate himself at the cost of Spain's interests, democracy was identified wi th an alternation of power in favour of a pa rty -the Popular Party -that came from the tradi tional right and needed to occupy the political centre, until then in the hands of the Socialists, in order to win the election. While the Socialists remained immersed in impotence, incapable of cleansing their image by means of a self-criticism that might restore their credibility and bring a bout the replaceme nt of their lenders, the Popular Party put together a skilful strategy that brought it to power in 1996.
After the c hange of government, with the same speed as before but this time in the opposite direc tion, the doom-laden tones were suspiciously replaced by a view tbat revived the encouraging normali ty of a historical course about to culminate in Spain's full integration into the new united Europe. The use of hi storiographic revisionism has been evident in the anniversaries enthusiastically supported by the Popular Party government.
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Thus the 'disaster' of a century ago (the 'crisis of 1898 ') ended up being presented as an exaggeration on the part of intellectuals stee ped in radicalism and demagoguery, unable to understand the extent to which, thanks to the efforts of the Liberal politicians of the time, Spain was then following the course of economic modernization and politics pursued by countries of the Western world.'~ Far from being a historical rarity in our country, libe ralism had a long tradition of modest successes back at least as far as the Restoration years under Canovas. At the same time, Canovas was rehabilitated as a true statesman who had been attacked by extremists of both tendencies. His regime. contrary to progressive or Marxist historiography, was declared to have had very positive effects. It had been able to put a stop to militarism for a long period, establish a system for the enjoyment of rights and freedoms equivalent to those of the most advanced countries in Europe, and create a climate of social peace that made possible the deve lopment of the Spanish economy. In the context of this kind of historiographic revisionism, highly favourable to the achievements of the Restoration regime but as exaggeratedly partial as the earlier scathing criticism, it is not surpri sing that the Popular Party took advantage of Ctinovas's centenary to convert him into the great precursor of their policies. ' 6 It had been much harder for the Conservative leader Manuel Fraga Iribarne when he championed Canovas, at a time when revisionist history did not yet exist and the predominant view was of a backward Spain in the hands of oligarchs and caciques.
Finally, the pretext of the quarter-centenary of the death of Philip II offered a further opportunity to use history for political ends, with a Spanish nationalist smugness that succeeded in wounding the sensibilities of Portuguese neighbours at Expo 98 in Lisbon. The supposed universality of which Jover spoke to us in connection with the quincentenary of the 'discovery' of America was now reinforced by a staging interested only in highlighting the splendour of a reign full of brilliance in the spheres of art and culture."
1 Seen in this light, Philip II was a prince of the Renaissance willing to govern a gre:.it 'confederation of territories' with wisdom and humanity -a king, according to the historian Henry Kamen, who pursued ' universal pleasures and interests' although ' imbued with a deep religiosity like most rulers of the time'." The book by this scholar of Spanish affairs, Philip of Spain, has also been a best-selle r,'" and, as Antonio Elorza rightly foresaw, it set the pattern for 'the commemorative image of the great king who inspired the name of the current heir to the Spanish throne' .-~i This desire on the part of our current rulers to display the most brilliant, normalized, acceptable part of our p:.ist -art, science, universalism -from a European perspective, setting aside social manifestations that have become less presentable and the conflicts that fonnerly marked us, now appears with very suspicious self-salisfied reileration. This happened once again in connection wilh the crisis of I 89&J• and has been repealed in exhibitions such as the one recently organized by the Valencian Aulonomous G overnment and the Archbishopric of Valencia on ' the important part played by the Church in the historical d evelo pment of the Yalencian Communily and the wealth of an artistic and cultural legacy thal is lo a large extent unknown '.n The title of the exhibition, 'The Light of Images', is highly illustrative; the darker areas, evidently, do not deserve to be remembered.
The current historiographic revisionism also has other political uses that are more worrying because of the intention lhat they reveal. Until very recently -in due correspondence with the optimism promoted by the current conjuncture of democratic stability and economic success, which, as we have seen, has modified our image of the past and lifted it out of its obsession with backwardness and decline -a veil of oblivion and caution had been drawn over our more recent history. Timely reference to lhis is made in Paloma Aguilar Femandez's book Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil espaiiola,·u and this situation, which, as we have seen, at the time worked in favou r of the reconciliation of Spaniards, could now have effects that might run counter to the establishment of democratic values. The demythologizing of the Republican side that is beginning to appear in histo rical research is clearly not the problem. Part of the work of historians constantly to revise what has been written about the past and to highlight any kind of ideological influence on the different ways of studying a historical event. The problem is the onesided, tendentious way in which the results of this research are being presented to a hroad public and the unusual interest aroused by these studies, especially when they are concerned with combating the image of those who fought on the Republican side during the 1936-39 war (this is the case with the International Brigades, lo give one example) or covertly seeking a partial rehabilitation of Franco's regime and of his person -in the final analysis, a pioneer in the victorious struggle against revolutionary socialism, as subsequently one of his admirers in Chile, General Augusto Pinochet, would also appear to have been. The defeat of communism and the success of modernization in our country thus seem lo be connected with a 'really not very fascist' regime, supposedly with an authoritarian ideology that was not particularly firm and consequently was capable of admitting internal dissidence which later made possi ble the pact leading to democracy. Such a fa lsificatio n of history, as some historians have recently charged, overlooks the degree to whicb Franco's dictatorship was radicall y antiliberal, lhe extent to which it repressed democrats of all kinds, and the way in which, until the very end, it hung on to its desire to be perpetuated, something that proved impossible as Spanish society developed and became integrated into E urope.
Finally, in contrast lo the situation during the years of struggle aguinsl the dictatorship, the idea of highlighting the diverse, plural reality of our country and at lhe same time pointing to its a common history seems to have little support. Works of synthesis offering a history of the ' uutonomous communities' provoke an angry reaction from advocates of a single history of the 'Spanish nation', who see the former approach as propitiating nationalist separatisms or becoming locked in Jocalism. The debate has extended into the area or the education of children und adolescents and the question of what kinds of history should be taught nowadays.-" Criticizing and demythologizing any kind of use of history for nationalist ends does not seem to have been defended consistently by a good many of the participants in this debate. This, at least, is the situation when the very individuals who present timely, well grounded criticism of Spanish historiographic nationalism nevertheless defend a nationalist history in the case of Catalonia (or the Catalan Lands), Euskal Herria, or Galicia. And the sume could be said of those who are in favour of dismantling myths about origins and nationalist manipulations of history when it is a question of these other nationalisms but who are none too willing to detach themselves from the idea of a Spanish national development basically identified with the history of the predominance of one society, one language and one culture (Castile). Three examples may serve to illustrate this: the controversy in Catalonia about the development of its historiography," the recent debate about the teaching of the humanities already mentioned (and the conception of the current Ministry of Culture and Education, the historians who have advised it, and the intellecLUals who have applauded it, not exactly of right-wing origin), and the recent award of a national essay prize lo the collective book Elser de Espaiia."' No doubt we should connect all this with the current debate about whether there is a need to reform the democratic Constitution of 1978 in the context of the demands for a greater degree of selfgovernment put forward by peripheral nationalisms.
As stated at the outset, history has an important political part to play in the current situation. The special feature of Spain among the Medite1rnnean countries in connection with the political uses of the past is apparent, broadly speaking, in a developmeut bounded by two .fi11-de-siecle crises of very different kinds. A hundred years ago, the disaster represented by the Joss of the last remnants of the colonial empire was evident to all. From that crisis a kind of 'regenerationist' nationalism emerged that advocated replacing the old stale of notables or oligarchs characteristic of a backward agrarian society with a different, more modern one supported by new social groups. The current crisis, however, must be set in a totally different social and political context. Its cause is not industrialization or any colonial disaster or general se nse of backwardness in re lation to other countries. The statement 'Spain is doing well', made by the Prime Minister, Jose Marla Aznar, immediately after coming to power in 1996, reveals the inordinate optimism that invades the country now, contrasting with the equally exaggerated pessimism of a century ago. If there is a crisis in Spain today it is certainly for other reasons, especially the awareness that the globalization to which Spain is lending is numbering the days of the nation-state just as it is in other parts of Europe.
In another context, therefore, very different from that of a century ago, in Spain too the various groups that dispute hegemony have linked their respective political projects to conflicting views of the past. Al first sight it would seem that we are faced with a new edition of the old, intem1inable debate about the 'problem of Spain' ; 11 first put forward during the crisis ut the end of the nineteenth century. However, the area of the debate is utterly different. Whercus 100 years ago the 'problem of Spain' arose from an awareness that its history was one that included numerous failures and an extraordinury decline, now the immediate future of a united Europe, in which for some years Spain has been playing a leading role, is tending to erase differences and highlight similarities in a development in which only successes are of interest. In this new European context, those who consider Spain's existence as a nation unchallengeable are advocates of a hi story that reinforces the collective feeling of belonging to that ·incontrovertible reality'. For those who think that Spain as a collective entity must gradually give way to other identities, in contrast, recourse to hi story serves to legitimize olher political options that may favour the maximum autonomy or even independence of hitherto stateless nations in the not too distant future.
However, anyone who thinks that the current debate will in future take place on the same intellectual horizon as in the pust is mistaken. Although a revival of conflict between nationalist ideologies appealing to hi story remains very likely, the fact is that in the new era that we are entering the crisis of national identities classically conceived -with or without a stale -is becoming increasingly apparent. Internal cultural homogenization and the exclusion of those who do not share the features of an ide ntity that, after all, can always be reinvented are becoming increasingly meaningless. Our world is tending towards multiculturalism, and the coexistence and superimposition of multifarious identities capable of resolving conflicts by means of dialogue and communication make it necessary to think about a new political use of history. This new use will be sorely needed lo provide an impulse for the future development of societies that will increasingly be experiencing both globalization and internal di fferentiation. If historians take refuge in scientific asepsis at this crucinl moment, others will go on using history to legitimize old powe rs and ir:npose identities that will perpetuate the cun-ent conflicts. 
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